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I. Theory of operation.

- A. What is to be removed? (Maximum objective breaking military tie with Moscow and removal of strictly offensive weapons.)
- B. How to determine what has been removed.
 - 1. To convince U.S.
 - 2. To convince U.S. public and others.
 - 3. Precedents.

II. Short term verification requirements.

A. Shipping.

- 1. Inbound.
 - a. UN port surveillance.
 - b. UN sea surveillance
 - c. US standby position and conditions for change.
- 2. Outbound.
 - a. Extent UN verification.
 - b. US standby capability.

B. Activities in Cuba.

- 1. UN verification.
 - a. Specified identified sites.
 - b. General inspection.
 - c. Techniques - air - ground.
 - d. Timing - air - ground.

2. US verification.

a. ~~Maximum objective breaking military tie~~ Sites vs. general inspection; i.e., requirement for US aerial reconnaissance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB
REVIEWED BY *Jim* DATE *5/9/88*
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DENY () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____
TS authority to: OADR
() CLASSIFY as _____
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

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III.

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III. Long term verification requirements.

- A. Duration of UN arrangements.
- B. Inauguration of OAS or nuclear free zone arrangements (Brazilian resolution).
- C. US standby requirement.

IV. Political Arrangements.

- A. Extent of U.S. guarantees.
 - 1. Not to invade.
 - 2. Regarding subversion - insurrection in Cuba.
 - 3. In multilateral framework.
- B. Reciprocal obligations of Cuba.
 - 1. Regarding Latin America.
 - 2. Regarding Guantanamo.
 - 3. International obligations.
- C. Multilateral arrangements.
 - 1. OAS.
 - 2. UN.
- D. Handling of refugees.

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